INTRODUCTION
Territoriality is established by aggression and functions as a mechanism of interference competition (Miller, 1967; Wilson, 1975; Kaufmann, 1983) . It is tempting to think of nearest neighbors as severest competitors (Alexander, 1974) . However, the relationship between territorial neighbors is not as simple as we often imagine. Fisher (1954, p. 73) pointed out that "the effect of holding territory . . . is to create 'neighbourhoods' of individuals . . . which are bound firmly and socially, to their next door neighbours by what in human terms would be described as a dear enemy or rival friend situation. . . ."Even if neighbors are locked in severe competition among themselves, they often have common enemies and mutual interests that add a cooperative dimension to a competitive situation. I will develop the argument that the relationship between territorial neighbors is "not 1 From the Symposium on Territoriality: Conceptual Advances in Field and Theoretical Studies presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Zoologists, 27-30 December 1984, at Denver, Colorado. 2 Present address: Kellogg Biological Station, Michigan State University, Hickory Corners, MI 49060.
strictly competitive" (see Mansfield, 1975) , and as a result, they should sometimes cooperate to form defensive coalitions against non-neighbors. This argument does not require close kinship between neighbors, although kinship may provide an additional reason for cooperation. The concept of aggressive coalitions is not new to the study of animal sociality (e.g., Packer, 1977; Davies and Houston, 1981; Bertram, 1982; Aoki, 1984) . Here, I extend the concept to the special relationship between unrelated, intraspecific territorial neighbors. I will begin with a very general economic analogy.
ECONOMIC ANALOGY: OLIGOPOLY Economic models have played a very important role in recent studies of territoriality (e.g., Schoener, 1987) . Most of our models are based on the analogy between an individual territory holder and "the firm in a perfectly competitive market" (see Mansfield, 1975) . This has been a very productive analogy, particularly with regard to questions about the existence and size of territories. However, all models involve abstraction and simplifications, and this 327 AN OLIGOPOLY OF NEIGHBORS MONOPOLIZES THE HABITAT.
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FIG. 1.
A schematic representation of the analogy between a group of territorial neighbors (N) and an oligopoly. Non-neighbors (U) threaten to (1) insert into the habit by carving out portions of several territories, or (2) usurp entire territories.
particular analogy fails to capture some interesting aspects of the social relationship between neighbors. Subtle and complex relationships are suggested by a different analogy comparing a group of established neighbors (N) to an oligopoly (Fig. 1) . By collectively monopolizing a limited habitat or resource space, the established neighbors create a class of excluded "floaters" (U). It is the existence of these non-neighbors (U) that leads us to believe that territoriality is important in population regulation (Wilson, 1975) . For the neighbors, the nonneighbors represent a common enemy, an outside threat to (1) insert into portions of several territories or (2) usurp a territory entirely.
Even if neighbors are engaged in severe competition among themselves, it is fairly obvious that they have a mutual interest in preventing the insertion of additional competitors (Getty, 1981a) . In this analysis I will focus on the second threat: usurpation. It is not obvious that the neighbors of a challenged resident should care whether the challenger succeeds in usurping the territory. I will develop two reasons why they should care.
The relationship between a resident and its established neighbors is inherently different from the relationship between a resident and a floater in search of a territory. A neighbor may pilfer resources or challenge for dominance over portions of a territory, but a usurper threatens the entire territory. The social structure inherent in this oligopolistic situation can be visualized by a simple network diagram (Fig. 2) . Imagine a pair of neighbors (a duopoly) faced with an outside threat from U. We expect all pairwise interactions to be negative. These negative interactions are not all identical, however. In addition, there may be an indirect positive relationship between the neighbors by virtue of the paths through U (double negative). Wrangham (1982) suggested that we call this kind of relationship an "interference mutualism." This is not to suggest that the net relationship between neighbors is positive, only that there is a positive component that can be varied with some independence from the direct negative link.
It is in oligopolistic situations that game theory is useful. Because there are so few players, the actions of one invite reactions from the others. (This is not the case for "the firm in a perfectly competitive market.") Oligopolists faced with an outside threat are in a situation that is "not strictly competitive," also known as a non-zerosum game. In a non-zero-sum game, one player's losses are not necessarily the other's gains. In some situations, both players can do well, or poorly. They may benefit from collusion and the formation of coalitions to erect what economists call "barriers to entry" (Mansfield, 1975) . Cooperative tactics allow the oligopolists to minimize the costs associated with the mutual, outside threat, even while they continue to compete among themselves.
ASYMMETRIC TERRITORIAL CHALLENGES
Within this very general conceptual framework, I will develop a more precise model by re-examining a specific familiar question: Why do territory owners usually defeat intruders? (Krebs, 1982) . There are many plausible, non-exclusive hypotheses to explain the resident-wins pattern in territorial challenges (reviewed by Krebs, 1982) . Evolutionary game theory (reviewed by Maynard Smith, 1982a) allows us to organize these hypotheses in terms of asymmetries between the two contestants, a resident (R, a member of N that is under challenge) and a challenger or potential usurper (U).
First, R might have greater "resource holding potential" (RHP, Parker, 1974) than U. RHP is roughly equivalent to fighting ability in a particular set of circumstances (Parker and Rubenstein, 1981) . RHP is not just brute strength. It may depend on experience, skill, and knowledge of the terrain. RHP can really only be determined in relative terms, as the probability of winning an all-out fight against a particular opponent in a given set of circumstances. Second, the payoff to R for successfully defending its domain might be greater than to U for successfully usurping. The magnitude of a payoff in absolute terms, like calories for instance, is not critical per se. It is the value relative to other payoffs available to a given contestant that is important in determining that contestant's best strategy (Parker, 1984) . If two animals contest food worth 100 kcal, but one has access to a 25 kcal consolation prize if it loses and the second does not, then the 100 kcal is more valuable to the second animal. In economic jargon, the second animal has a higher "opportunity cost" for losing.
RHP and payoff asymmetries are "payoff relevant" because they ultimately combine to determine expected payoffs to each contestant (Hammerstein, 1981) . The best tactic for each contestant is assumed to be the one with the highest expected value. The expected value of a tactic like all-out fighting is determined by the value of the various possible outcomes (like winning or losing), weighted by the probability of each outcome. If both contestants fight all out, the outcome is determined probabilistically by the respective RHPs. However, it is possible for all-out fighting to have a low expected payoff value for the contestant with high RHP, and vice versa. This is why the "toughest fighter" should not always "win" contests. Sometimes it is better off (it wins in a different sense) by not fighting a challenger with lower RHP.
A third asymmetry, ownership per se, is "payoff irrelevant" because it does not affect the expected payoff value of the various tactics. Ownership could provide a convention for settling contests where no payoff-relevant asymmetries exist (Maynard Smith and Parker, 1976) . Krebs (1982) argued convincingly, however, that most territorial challenges do not meet the conditions necessary to make this conventional asymmetry an important determinant of who wins. Therefore, I will focus on payoff-relevant asymmetries (RHP and the payoff value of the various possible outcomes), and not consider payoff irrelevant conventions any further.
There are several reasons why we might expect an individual in the role R to have a greater RHP than an individual in the role U. First, there could be presorting of individuals into roles by fighting ability. Younger, weaker animals and older "losers" might be forced to repeatedly play the role U against older, stronger, and tougher established residents (R). This is basically an effect of repeated sampling after roles are established. Second, knowledge of the terrain could give R a "home court advantage" over U whereas they would have equal RHPs on a "neutral court."
Even if R and U have equal RHPs, there are several reasons why we might expect the payoff to R for retaining a territory to exceed the payoff to U for usurping. I will assume that the payoff to either for not having a territory is about equally bad. One possibility is that R might have knowledge about the distributions of risks and resources that allows it to forage safely and efficiently. U would have a reduced payoff rate while it acquired (learned) this knowledge. A second possibility was recently suggested by Krebs (1982) : that a familiar neighbor (N) could contribute to a payoff asymmetry between R and U. Established, stable neighbors sometimes develop a relationship described as the "dear enemy phenomenon" (Fisher, 1954; Wilson, 1975; Jaeger, 1981) . Dear enemies exhibit reduced aggression at mutually recognized territorial boundaries. Krebs' insight was that the dear enemy relationship is established only after a period of costly "negotiations" over a divisible resource: space. After successful usurpation, U must renegotiate the dear-enemy relationship with N before it can assume the role of new-R (now a dear enemy with N). As a result, the future value of a territory to U is discounted by the costs of future negotiations. As with the learning hypothesis above, R has already "paid its dues." COOPERATIVE DEFENSE Before addressing why N should help R, we need to consider the possibility that N helps R incidentally, while defending its own territory. U is ultimately a threat to both territories, even if it is challenging R at the moment. Incidental help is probably very common (e.g., Burger, 1980; Getty, 1981ft) , but it should not be considered cooperation. We do not hypothesize, in this situation, that usurpation of R by U has any impact on N. In an earlier paper (Getty, 1981 a) I argued that this kind of incidental help should lead animals to settle closer together than we would otherwise expect. The question of cooperation hinges on whether N incurs additional immediate costs beyond those necessary to defend its own territory. This will not generally be easy to determine. I will consider this problem further below.
Beginning where Krebs left off, I will analyze two sets of conditions that should lead an unrelated neighbor N to help resident R increase its RHP relative to a challenger U. The first reason follows very simply from Krebs' hypothesis about the cost of renegotiating a new dear-enemy relationship between U and N. An implication of this hypothesis is that N also has to pay these costs. N can avoid having to renegotiate borders with this (potentially more powerful) new-R by interfering with U's ability to displace the current R. Helping R would, in effect, create a "home court advantage" by increasing R's relative RHP. Help from N could be as simple as harassing U in border areas where R would not be harassed, or it could be as dramatic and effective as N and R simultaneously chasing U over wide areas. Help from N could have net positive benefits to N in the short run if the cost of helping is less than the cost of renegotiating. If the cost of helping is low, however, it will be difficult to test this hypothesis against the hypothesis that help is incidental. These two alternatives could be tested by examining challenges to neighbors that have not yet established a dear-enemy relationship. This first reason for cooperation does not require reciprocation (cf. Trivers, 1971; Bertram, 1982) .
The second possibility is that the benefits of reciprocal help from R to N would be more than adequate to compensate N for the immediate net costs of helping R defeat U. Fascination with kinship has led us to underrate the importance of reciprocal altruism, or intraspecific mutualism, in animal social systems (Maynard Smith, 1982ft) . Paying immediate costs (giving help) to get the benefits of reciprocation (getting help) is a risky tactic however. It might, under some conditions, be modelled by the prisoner's dilemma game (reviewed by Axelrod, 1984) .
It has been suggested that the prisoner's dilemma (PD) is a good model of the relationship between stable territorial neighbors (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981) , but no one has clearly specified the tactics and payoffs. I will briefly review PD and place the dear-enemy relationship in the PD framework. Then I will develop the second hypothesis, a new PD game based on reciprocal help in territorial defense. I will call this second hypothesis the "defensive coalition game." THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA The prisoner's dilemma is a formal model of a contest between two players. The model has been analysed in great detail by many authors (e.g., Luce and Raiffa, 1957) , but it has been popularized recently by Axelrod (1984) . PD is based on some spe-cific conditions that are probably applicable to a great variety of social interactions. The concept and the name are explained by Hacking (1984, p. 17) :
"Two thieves in cahoots are caught and await trial. They are locked in isolated cells. The prosecutor goes to each offering a deal. 'Confess and implicate the other: if he is meanwhile maintaining innocence, we shall set you free and imprison him for five years. If neither of you confesses, you will both get two years for lack of better evidence. If you both confess we will give each of you a slightly mitigated four year term.'
Thief A reasons thus: if thief B does not confess, I go free by confessing. If thief B does confess but I do not, I get five years in jail. So whatever B does, I had better confess and implicate B. Thief B reasons identically. So both confess and both get four years. Had both remained silent, each would have got only two years in jail. Game theory teaches each thief to act in his own worst interests."
The payoff matrix for PD is shown in Figure 3 . Using Axelrod's terminology, the tactics are C = cooperate with the other player (e.g., don't confess) D = defect, i.e., don't cooperate (e.g., confess). The expected payoffs/iteration are t = the temptation to defect (0 years in prison) r = the reward for mutual cooperation (2 years in prison) p = the punishment for mutual defection (4 years in prison) s = the sucker's payoff (5 years in prison).
For the game to be PD, the payoffs must meet the following criteria: t > r > p > s and r > (t + s)/2. The payoffs need not be symmetrical, they could be specified as r, and r 2 etc. It is only necessary that these two criteria are met within each player's payoff set. For simplicity, I will assume that the game is symmetrical (but not zero-sum).
Mutual cooperation pays better for each player than mutual non-cooperation: r > Axelrod, 1984) . The payoff above the diagonal in each cell goes to contestant 1, the payoff below to contestant 2. Tactics (C, D) and payoffs (t, r, p, s) are explained in the text. This matrix assumes that the probability of reiteration (w) is independent of the tactics.
p. Mutual cooperation is equivalent to reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) , which, in the long run, is not actually altruistic (Bertram, 1982) . Unfortunately (for the players) cooperation is risky in the short run, and mutual cooperation is not an equilibrium pair of strategies. Each player is tempted to play the other for a sucker because t > r. Each fears being played for a sucker because s < p. A sucker is an altruist because it sacrifices without compensation (Bertram, 1982) . Players should avoid being altruistic! If the game is reiterated a known, finite number of times, the rational strategy for each player is to defect on every play. The dilemma is that individual rationality leads both players to do poorly (p < r). How, then, can cooperation emerge without central authority, laws, and enforcement mechanisms? Axelrod (1984) showed that if the game is reiterated probabilistically the tactic of cooperation can emerge from individuals pursuing their own selfish best strategies. Under certain conditions, the strategy "tit-for-tat" can be established as a Nash equilibrium, or unbeatable evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS, Maynard Smith and Price, 1973) .
The strategy tit-for-tat is to cooperate on the first move and thereafter always do what the other player did on the preceding play. Tit-for-tat is "nice, provokable, forgiving, and clear," and it is amazingly robust (Axelrod, 1984) . When established as an ESS, tit-for-tat results in stable mutual cooperation within the population.
It is the prospect of an indefinitely long period of retribution that can make tit-fortat an ESS. A single t will not pay if it will be followed by innumerable p's. If there is a finite probability w that a game will be reiterated after each play, then the expected number of plays converges on 1/1 -w). w discounts future payoffs that may never arrive. One or the other player will eventually leave the game. At any point in a series of plays, the expected future payoff to tit-for-tat against tit-for-tat is r collected 1/(1 -w) times, or r/(l -w). The expected future payoff to the strategy of always defecting against tit-for-tat is t + w(p/(l -w)) (Axelrod, 1984) . Tit-for-tat will be an ESS if r / ( l -w) > t + w(p/ (1 -w)). This condition will follow whenever the probability of reiteration is sufficiently high: w > (t -r)/(t -p). Axelrod's analysis assumes that w is a single constant. The payoffs are determined by the tactics, but the probability of reiteration is not. I will develop a more general analysis that allows w to vary with the tactics.
THE DEAR ENEMY PD
Before examining the "defensive coalition game," I will briefly consider how the game PD and the strategy tit-for-tat might be construed to represent the dear-enemy relationship. First, I define an iteration as a small, discrete period of time during which the players exhibit behavior that is consistent with one tactic or the other (C or D). The game is roughly symmetrical and the players can be designated N, and N 2 . Suppose that what we call the dearenemy relationship is the result of mutual cooperation. Then the tactic C can be denned as (1) not challenging your neighbor for portions of its territory or pilfering from its mutually recognized domain, and (2) not being particularly vigilant toward your neighbor, on the assumption that it can be trusted not to challenge or pilfer. D means challenging and pilfering. The payoff r is the reward that can be accumulated (as components of fitness, like food or reproduction) during an iteration with reduced vigilance, fewer fights, no loss to pilfering by the neighbor, and no gain from pilfering from the neighbor, p is the net reward accumulated given mutual pilfering, fighting, and a general lack of respect for territorial boundaries. I will simply assume that for dear enemies, r > p. Mutual cooperation is better than mutual defection, t should be roughly equal to r plus the value of items pilfered from a non-vigilant neighbor, s should equal r minus the value of lost items. The concept of economic defendability (Brown, 1964) implies that p > s. Resources are worth fighting for. Otherwise, we would not be dealing with a territorial system in the first place. Thus, the first condition for PD is met: t > r > p > s. The second condition follows from the importance of distance in centralplace economics (Getty, 19816) . The net value toNi of a food item lost to N 2 near home (r -s) should be greater than the net value to N, of the same item pilfered by Nj from N 2 , far away (t -r). Therefore, r -s > t -r or s < 2r -t. This implies the second condition: (t + s)/2 < [t + (2r -t)]/2 = r. If w is sufficiently large, then tit-for-tat would be an ESS and the tactics of mutual cooperative respect for territory boundaries would correspond to the dear-enemy phenomenon.
Placing the dear-enemy phenomenon in the PD framework merely imposes an interpretation on a widely recognized behavior pattern. The model I am about to develop predicts a pattern of behavior that I think is fairly common, but is rarely recognized for what it really is: cooperative defense of neighboring territories.
THE DEFENSIVE COALITION PD
Now we can proceed to develop the second hypothesis, that reciprocation forms the basis for cooperative defense. The analysis should realistically model a resident and all of its neighbors simultaneously, in an n-player game (n > 2). This is a very difficult scenario. I will simplify the situation into separate two-player games. Each resident is engaged in several pairwise games, one with each of its neighbors. This should lead to conservative conclusions, in the sense that cooperative defense should be less costly, and more likely, when larger coalitions can form. The game, then, is between a pair of neighbors N, and N 2 , but a non-neighboring potential usurper U plays an important role in determining the payoffs to N] and N 2 . When U challenges one neighbor, say N,, N, plays the role of resident R, while N 2 plays the role of neighbor N.
It is simplest to think of an iteration as a pair of challenges, one to Ni and one to N 2 . Each player plays the role R once and N once. It is somewhat more complicated to think of an iteration as a single challenge probabilistically distributed between N, and N 2 . In this new game, merely being a dear enemy is defection. Cooperation requires more, it requires help. Defection could, in fact, be worse than being a dear enemy, but it simplifies matters to assume that N, and N 2 have already stabilized their relationship. The tactics are defined as: C = in the role N, help R defend against U D = in the role N, be a dear enemy but don't help. The payoff to each player for defeating its challenger and retaining its territory are: p = the dear-enemy payoff r = p + b -c t = p + b s = p -c.
Where: c = the gross cost of helping = t -r = p -s (from above), b = the gross benefit of receiving help = t -p = r -s. b -c = the net benefit of reciprocal help = r -p.
Any three of these variables could be considered "independent," requiring empirical estimation to determine the remaining three.
What would cause the benefit of receiving help to exceed the cost of giving help? Theoretical arguments (Parker and Rubenstein, 1981) and empirical data (Hazlett et al., 1975) suggest that the duration and intensity of a fight between R and U should decrease as the difference in RHP increases. Help from N to R, in effect, raises the rel- ative RHP of R. Thus the total cost to N and R of two cooperative fights should be less than the total cost of two solo fights. N and R need not contribute equally to the defense of R's territory. If total costs decrease with cooperative defense, then r > p and b > c. As before, effective help from N could be as simple as harassing U along the border where R is not harassed. If the payoffs are collected then the game is reiterated with probability w, and if w is independent of the tactics and payoffs (the usual assumption), then b > c implies that the game is PD (Fig. 3) . Tit-for-tat would be an ESS whenever w > (t -r)/(t -p) = c/b. However, in the defensive coalition PD the fitness-related payoffs can be collected only if R actually repels U and retains the territory until the next iteration (Fig. 4) . The probability of collecting the payoff, given the tactics (i), is Wj, the probability that the game will be reiterated. Wj, as well as the cost of a successful defense, should be sensitive to the RHP differential between R and U. We can make the following deductions: (1) A neighbor that gets help without giving in return is more likely to survive an iteration than one that gives as well as gets (w, > w r ). (2) The RHP advantage created by mutual, reciprocal help makes each neighbor more likely to survive an iteration of two shared defenses than one solo defense each (w r > w p ). A sucker is less likely to survive than a neighbor that neither gives nor gets (w s < w p ). Therefore, w t > w r > w p > w s . Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that w t - The expected payoff/iteration for each pair of tactics can be visualized as a point in a unit square. X = the probability of repelling a usurper and collecting the payoff (e.g., w p ). Y = the fitness payoff that is conditional on repelling the usurper, normalized to t, the largest value (e.g., p/t). The expected future payoff to repeated mutual defection or cooperation is YX/(1 -X). Isovalues (K) are defined by pairs of X and Y such that K = YX/(1 -X). Rearranging this relationship shows that isovalue lines are defined by Y = K/X -X. In the figure, K has been arbitrarily set to 1, 2, 3 . . . . Tit-for-tat is an ESS whenever K r (for mutual cooperation) and K p (for mutual defection) differ by more than w, (see text). Since w, < 1.0, it is a conservative but simple rule that tit-for-tat is an ESS whenever K r -K p > 1.0. This criterion is met whenever the X, Y coordinates for mutual cooperation (w r , r/t) and mutual defection (w p , p/t) are separated by two or more isovalue lines. The slopes of the lines show that the criterion is much more sensitive to w r -w p than to r / t -p/t.
The expected payoff in a single iteration can be computed as the probability of retaining the territory times the fitness payoff that is conditional on retention, where: tw, > rw r > pw p > sw 5 . This game is PD whenever rw r > (tw, + sw s )/2 or rw r -sw s > tw, -rw r . This condition is satisfied by rw r > pw p . The condition for tit-for-tat to be an ESS is now complicated by the many w s s: rw r /(l -w r ) > tw, + pw p /(l -w p ) or [(r/t)w r /(l -w r )] -KpA)w p /(l -w p )] > (l)w t As before, the difference in expected future payoffs to always cooperating versus always defecting must exceed the payoff to playing the opponent for a sucker once. Unlike the earlier analyses that assumed w, = w r = w p = w s = w, this relationship is sensitive to six variables and I cannot reduce it to a simpler form without unjustifiable assumptions. A numerical analysis would be very tedious. Instead, I will develop a graphical presentation that shows that tit-for-tat is an ESS over a wide range of conditions.
The expected payoffs for a single iteration are the products of two variables that can be thought of as Euclidian dimensions: X = the probability of retaining the territory and Y = the fitness payoff that is conditional on retention. The Y dimension can be scaled to t, the largest value. This allows us to construct a unit square ( Many combinations of p / t and w p yield the same expected future payoff: K p = (p/t)w p / (1 -w p ). The same is true for C against C, where: K r = (r/t)w r (l -w r ). In general, isovalues of K p and K r are defined by pairs of points X and Y such that K = YX/(1 -X). Rearranging this relationship shows that any particular value of K can be expected from any combination of X and Y that falls on the line Y = K/X -K (Fig.  5) . These isovalue lines intersect the top of the square (Y = 1) at X = K/(K + 1) and all converge at the bottom on (1, 0).
Tit-for-tat is an ESS whenever K r -K p > w,. There is a conservative but simple way to visualize this criterion. The isovalue lines in Figure 5 were chosen to increase in increments of 1. Since w, < 1, tit-for-tat will be an ESS whenever (w r , r/t) and (w p , p/t) are separated by two or more isovalue lines. The isovalue lines become extremely close as X approaches 1. K is very sensitive to changes in X in this upper range. Very small increments in the probability of retaining the territory yield very large increments in the expected future payoff, because of the increasing number of reiterations. For this reason, a very small difference between K r and K p is all that is required to make tit-for-tat an ESS.
A precise evaluation of the criterion requires a simple numerical analysis. I will work through one illustrative example. I expect all values of w, to be high. R should have a greater than 50:50 chance of repelling U, even without the help of N, for the reasons discussed earlier. An alliance between R and N should be virtually unbeatable. As a result, helping should not be very costly or risky. U should resign the field quickly in the face of a large RHP differential. Suppose w t = 0.99, w p = 0.90 and p/t = r / t = 0.90. A 1.1% difference between w r and w p would be sufficient to make tit-for-tat an ESS. This minimum 1.1% increase in w yields a 12% increase in the expected future payoff. If r / t > p / t, then w r -Wp could be even smaller.
In any payoff matrix, many conceivable tactics are excluded. It is easy to think of other tactics besides C and D. Two possibilities that come immediately to mind are (1) negotiations between N and R over territorial concessions in return for help against U and (2) negotiations between N and U over future concessions by U if N helps to displace R. Both of these tactics can be eliminated from consideration for reasons of symmetry. (1) If help from N to R could only be bought with ceded space, the extorted space would simply pass back and forth within each iteration. There would be no net gain in space and there would probably be costs associated with the additional negotiations. (2) If N and U formed a coalition to displace R, no contestant would remain on its territory more than one iteration. Any short-term benefits that U ceded to N (a larger territory) would be followed by tremendous long-term costs (almost immediate displacement from the larger territory when the next U comes along). Many other tactics that seem clever at first (for half an iteration) are obviously inferior when their ultimate consequences are appreciated. Large RHP asymmetries between N and R open up strategic possibilities not considered here, like forced altruism and extortion (Bertram, 1982) .
CONCLUSIONS
In an interesting little paper titled "Ornithologists as Unconscious Theorists" Krebs (1980, p. 409) reminded us that "(t)here is no such thing as a pristine, unbiased observation." Observations are inevitably influenced by expectations, whether or not these expectations derive from formal theory. This fact may be disturbing to those with a naive view of objectivity. However, we obviously cannot apply the hypothetico-deductive approach until we organize our expectations into hypotheses. In more general terms, we rarely discover a phenomenon that we did not expect to exist. If reciprocal cooperative defense among unrelated territorial neighbors exists, it has, no doubt, been observed, but remains unrecognized because it is unexpected.
The arguments presented by Krebs (1982) are consistent with a pattern of shared defense. If a neighbor (N) attacks a challenger (U) in border areas where it would attack a resident (R) less vigorously, or not at all, N effectively increases the RHP of R relative to U. Neighbors create or contribute to a "home court advantage" in RHP. If U usurps R nonetheless, U and N may have to engage in costly negotiations before U can assume the role of R, as a dear enemy of N. In this sequence, N reduces the relative RHP of U at the time of challenge, as I have proposed, and the expected future payoff to U for winning, as Krebs has proposed. Neither hypothesis requires that the other be true.
Careful experiments will be necessary before we can tell if cooperative defense occurs in any particular territorial system, and if so, why. A major challenge will be to disentangle cooperation from incidental help. This problem has long plagued analyses of alarm calls. The stable, sedentary nature of most territorial systems may facilitate the analysis of cooperation, as well as encourage its existense. A second challenge is to determine the extent to which cooperation is driven by kinship rather than reciprocation. Both may operate. I hope this analysis gives some confidence that these challenges are worth pursuing.
